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单词 Miller’s case (No. 2)
释义

Miller’s case (No. 2)
The landmark conjoined cases R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland ([2019] UKSC 41), also known as Miller/Cherry. The cases concern the limitations on the Prime Minister’s power, under the royal prerogative, to prorogue Parliament at his will. When Prime Minister Boris Johnson prorogued Parliament in August 2019, many commentators saw this executive decision as one deliberately devised to curtail parliamentary discussion of the legislation concerning the departure of the UK from the European Union (see Brexit). The question brought before the Supreme Court was this: Was the advice that the Prime Minister gave to Her Majesty the Queen with regard to the prorogation justiciable? And if so, could such a decision be quashed upon one of the grounds on which a remedy can be provided in judicial review, namely illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety?

The Supreme Court began its judgment by noting that in the Case of Proclamations (1610) 12 Co Rep 74, inter alia, the Crown had no prerogative but what the law of the land allowed. In this sense, the lawfulness of the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen to prorogue Parliament was justiciable. When it came to assessing the boundaries of the prerogative powers, the court took the view that the executive had clearly trespassed beyond those legal boundaries. It had done so when the design and purpose of the prorogation was to have the deliberate effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. The use of the common-law prerogative power in this manner, all 11 justices determined, was incompatible with the principle of responsible government.

The Supreme Court further determined that the Bill of Rights 1688 art 9 and the Claim of Right 1689, which preclude the courts from questioning proceedings in Parliament, did not apply: prorogation was not a proceeding in Parliament; it was imposed upon it from outside (by the executive). Had the source of power been that of statute, the act of prorogation would have been declared ultra vires. Given that it was a common-law power, the court declared that it was unlawful (i.e. illegal). The effect of the judgment was that the advice in the Order in Council to the Queen to prorogue Parliament was null and of no effect. The court would declare that Parliament had not been prorogued.

The second Miller judgment was a remarkable decision. The position is well summed up by a former Justice of the Supreme Court, Lord Sumption: “What has happened is that in the face of a particularly disgraceful constitutional abuse the courts have now moved the boundaries—and that’s what happens if you have a power and you abuse it, you find that the system steps in to curtail it. This is how our constitution, which is famously flexible, ought to work.” This, as might be understood, is a point of controversy and has opened discussion about the law-making powers of the Supreme Court and the issue of separation of powers.

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更新时间:2024/12/27 0:52:43