| 单词 | Statutory interpretation |
| 释义 | 法定釋義 The interpretation of the meaning, effect, and scope of statutes by the courts. The most significant rules of statutory interpretation appear to have been the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief rule. These old rules are of a complementary nature or at least have the potential for complementing each other. Elements of each of them can still be found in how the courts interpret statutes nowadays. The modern tendency to give statutes a purposive construction may be viewed as being to an appreciable extent a development from the mischief rule in particular: Medical Council of Hong Kong v Chow Siu Shek David [2000] 2 HKC 428 (CFA). As to the conditions under which a purposive construction is applicable: Leung Sai Lun, Robert v Leung May Ling [1998] 1 HKC 26 (CA). An Ordinance shall be deemed to be remedial and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Ordinance according to its true intent, meaning and spirit: Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) s 19. When the true position under a statute is to be ascertained by interpretation, it is necessary to read all of the relevant provisions together and in the context of the whole statute as a purposive unity in its appropriate legal and social setting. Furthermore it is necessary to identify the interpretative considerations involved and then, if they conflict, to weigh and balance them: Medical Council of Hong Kong v Chow Siu Shek David [2000] 2 HKC 428. Courts recognise the appropriateness of adopting an interpretation that overrides or rectifies defects in the wording of a statute so as to give effect to the legislative intention and avoid an absurd result. In adopting a remedial construction the court must be sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and the legislature failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision the legislature would have made, although not necessarily the precise words the legislature would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed: Chan Pun Chung v HKSAR [2000] 3 HKLRD 498, 4 HKC 283 (CFA). Also known as ‘statutory construction’. See also Golden rule; Literal rule; Mischief rule; Purposive approach. 法庭就成文法的涵義、效力及範疇作出的釋義。最重要的法定釋義規則看來是按字面詮釋規則、金科玉律和不確切文字釋義規則。 此等長久以來的規則具有互補的性質或至少有潛在的互補的性質。仍可就法庭現今詮釋成文法的方法察覺其中的元素。現時傾向就成文法給予有目的的釋義，這可被視為從不確切文字釋義規則所發展的：Medical Council of Hong Kong v Chow Siu Shek David [2000] 2 HKC 428 (終審法院)。就有目的的釋疑可予適用的條件而言：Leung Sai Lun, Robert v Leung May Ling [1998] 1 HKC 26 (上訴法庭)。條例必須當作有補缺去弊的作用，按其真正用意、涵義及精神，並為了最能確保達致其目的而作出公正、廣泛及靈活的釋疑及釋義：《釋義及通則條例》(第1章)第19條。在須由釋義確定某成文法的真正處境時，須一起讀出所有有關的條文、並以最適當的法律及社會的處境以有目的的整體解釋成文法的全部。此外，須辨識涉及的釋義的考慮，如有抵觸，可予以衡量及平衡：Medical Council of Hong Kong v Chow Siu Shek David [2000] 2 HKC 428。如某釋意可推翻或改正某成文法字眼上的缺點，因而使法例的用意得以生效，並可避免荒謬的結果，則法庭會承認此等釋義。在採納補救釋疑時，法庭必須肯定三項事項：(1)受爭議的法規或條文的原定用途；(2)因起草者及立法機構的疏漏而未能就有關條文的目的給予效力；及(3)如已察覺有關草案的錯誤，則立法機構應已訂定的有關條文的實質內容(但無需是立法機構應使用的確切字眼)：Chan Pun Chung v HKSAR [2000] 3 HKLRD 498, 4 HKC 283 (終審法院)。另稱「法定釋疑」。另見 Golden rule; Literal rule; Mischief rule; Purposive approach。 |
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